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Recent years have seen a growing push toward Portfolio
Management Models that incorporate a variety of “providers”
operating public schools. One rationale for this is that such organizations can offer distinct and innovative educational practices.
This article describes the Diverse Provider Model implemented in
Philadelphia from 2002–2008, and the shifts in practices by many
outside providers away from distinction and toward alignment
with the district approach. Drawing on institutional theory, we
examine possible explanations for these shifts, including the particular structures and incentives in Philadelphia and discuss what
can be learned about the prospects for innovation through outside
providers.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, an increasing number of large urban districts have begun to
move toward a portfolio management model (PMM), shifting away from
a centralized bureaucracy that directly manages a relatively uniform set
of schools toward a model in which a central office oversees a portfolio
of schools (governed as charters or traditional district schools) that offers
diverse organizational and curricular themes and is managed by a mix of
public and private actors (Bulkley, 2010; Hill, Campbell, & Gross, 2012). Such
districts include Chicago, where the “Renaissance 2010” program initiated
by Arne Duncan incorporated 100 new schools operating under different
management structures (charter, private management, and special “empowerment” schools that had greater autonomy than regular district-run schools)
and New York City, where both public and private providers work as support
organizations for all public schools (Gyurko & Henig, 2010; Menefee-Libey,
2010). Other cities have made moves in this direction, including Washington,
DC, Baltimore, Los Angeles, Cleveland, and Oakland.
One of the core ideas for such reforms is that outside organizations
will bring innovation and improvement to struggling schools and systems.
According to Paul Hill, one of the leading advocates for portfolio models,
and his colleagues, “A portfolio district is built for continuous improvement
via expansion and imitation of the highest-performing schools, closure, and
replacement of the lowest-performing, and constant search for new ideas”
(Hill et al., 2009, p. 1).
In 2002, Philadelphia became one of the nation’s leaders in one aspect
of the PMM idea—hiring for-profit and nonprofit organizations to manage
district schools. The Philadelphia diverse provider model (DPM), which was
implemented under a state takeover, involved outside organizations in the
management of district schools; advocates promised that the model would
enhance the capacity of these schools to innovate as well as spur school
improvement in the district as a whole.1 Advocates of the Philadelphia DPM,
especially supporters at the state level, were optimistic that the DPM would
lead to a “shake up” of the system by disrupting institutional structures and
culture through bringing in organizations with different histories, incentive
structures, and programs to manage existing public schools.
In the article, we draw on institutional theory to lend insights into the
implementation of the DPM. Institutional theory, based on the premise that
broad “cultural scripts guide much organizational behavior,” has the potential to lend insights into the analysis of such reforms (Burch, 2007, p. 84).
Although increasingly acknowledging that institutional change does occur,
theorists working in this area suggest that creating deep changes of the
kind sought by PMM advocates is challenging—and that “institutional isomorphism,” in which new institutional structures come in line with existing
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practices and the broader environment is more likely to occur (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 2006).
This article examines the case of Philadelphia, between the inception
of the DPM in the fall of 2002 and 2008, prior to the formal changes to
the relationship brought about in 2009 by Superintendent Arlene Ackerman
(which included moving toward outside providers that were “partners” rather
than “managers” of district schools; Socolar, 2009). Substantial changes have
continued under Superintendent William Hite, but this article focuses on the
earlier years that laid the foundation for the current context (Mezzacappa,
2012). By 2008, the programs offered by the providers became increasingly similar to the district’s own centralized educational program (Bulkley,
Christman, & Gold, 2010). In particular, many providers altered their programs to come in line with the district’s “Managed Instruction System” (MIS),
which included a core curriculum, pacing schedule, texts, Benchmark assessments on a 6-week cycle as well as SchoolNet, an online data management
and resource tool.
Our research examines three related questions:
1. What distinctive practices and programs were initially adopted by
providers?
2. How did the practices and programs of the providers evolve between
2002 and 2008?
a. In what ways did these approaches become more similar to the
Philadelphia School District’s centralized educational reforms, implemented in the 2nd year of the takeover?
b. In what ways did the approaches remain distinctive?
3. What pressures played a role in the changes in providers’ practices and
programs?
We describe the changes that took place, and then draw on insights
from institutional theory to examine the pressures that led both to increased
common ground as well as ongoing differences between providers and the
district. Building on this analysis, we conclude by discussing implications for
other districts seeking to create institutional change through contracting with
outside organizations for school management.

PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT MODELS
According to advocates of PMMs, the introduction of schools run by outside
organizations such as educational management organizations (EMOs) will
enhance the capacity of under-performing schools to innovate as well as spur
school improvement in the district as a whole (Bulkley, Henig, & Levin, 2010;
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Hill et al., 2012; Hill, Campbell, & Harvey, 2000; Hill, Pierce, & Guthrie, 1997).
Thus, EMOs are expected to provide diverse curricular, instructional, and
governance models in flexible, competitive “school marketplaces,” in which
the district manages a varied portfolio of schools with providers that have
wide rein to innovate, but are also held accountable for student outcomes
by strong contracts (Christman, Gold, & Herold, 2006; Hill et al., 2009; Hill
et al., 1997).
Underlying the idea of a PMM is the belief that school failure is the
result of entrenched educational bureaucracies that are unable to reform
themselves. Problems of low academic performance and fiscal distress are
attributed to a lack of sound management practices by district and school
leaders as well as union contracts that emphasize narrow work restrictions
and a rigid inward-looking professional bureaucracy that eschews innovative
practices.
Hill and colleagues (2009) describe key features of a PMM, including
that:
●

●
●

●

●
●

Districts manage portfolios of schools, which may include charters, districtrun schools and schools managed by external providers with whom the
district contracts;
Districts select and assign providers;
Districts write and monitor contracts, which include clear performance
indicators and performance measures;
Providers receive fixed per pupil amounts and have increased budgetary
discretion;
Providers, not districts, employ teachers and principals; and
Quality options and meaningful choice exist for students and families.

In this article, we focus on one aspect of the PMM idea—the role of
“diverse” providers as school managers—and the argument that such outside
providers will increase the availability of distinct options within the system
of public education.

INSTITUTIONAL THEORY FOR ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF
DIVERSE PROVIDERS
In their seminal piece on institutional isomorphism, DiMaggio and Powell
(building on Hawley, 1968), define isomorphism as “a constraining process
that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the
same set of environmental conditions” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 149).
In their discussion, DiMaggio and Powell argue that there are two types
of isomorphism—competitive and institutional. Isomorphism that results
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from competitive pressures, in theory, leads to more effective and efficient organizations. However, they and others suggest that a second type of
isomorphism—based on institutional pressures—may often be responsible
for the commonalities found across organizations within an organizational
field. Here, we discuss the role of institutions and markets in creating
isomorphic pressures.
The concept of institutional isomorphism can help in understanding
how new organizations entering an existing organizational field respond
to the pressures of a new environment. Institutional isomorphism focuses
on the argument that, “Organizations compete not just for resources and
customers, but for political power and institutional legitimacy, for social as
well as economic fitness” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 150). Two sets of
forces, coercive and noncoercive, can lead to isomorphism that is based on
institutional—rather than competitive—pressures.
According to Scott (2008), “the use of coercion requires relatively clear
demands, effective surveillance, and significant sanctions” (p. 134). Such
pressures rely heavily on power and inducements and come largely from the
political and legal environment. Although government policies are the most
discussed form of coercive pressures, other forms of legally-binding requirements (such as union contracts) are also coercive mechanisms (Paauwe &
Boselie, 2003).
Although DiMaggio and Powell discussed two other types of pressures
that can lead to institutional isomorphism (normative and mimetic pressures),
here we follow Levy’s (2006) lead and combine these into the broader category of “noncoercive” isomorphic pressures. Among the most important
noncoercive pressures that can lead new organizations to become similar
to existing ones are strong professional networks and norms. Such pressures tie closely to those discussed by Scott (2008), building on the work of
Strang and Meyer (1993), who argues that for new organizations to take on
the practices of existing ones, “actors involved need to regard themselves
as similar in some important respect” (p. 137). This is of particular importance in environments with considerable uncertainty and ambiguity. In such
environments, actors are pressured to find “known quantities” to emulate.
In recent years, institutional isomorphism as a significant set of pressures leading to organizational conformity has been increasingly evident as
the broader environment for education has changed since the 1970s and
1980s—especially as the push toward standards-based reform and more
testing has led to tighter coupling between broad ideas and policies and
fine-grained educational practices (Davies, Quirke, & Aurini, 2006). Rowan
(2006a) argues, implicitly, that one of the reasons for institutional isomorphism is that public education in the United States has not solely been
in the public sector, but that the web of organizations that interact with
schools on a regular basis exert considerable pressure. Specifically, he argues
that, “the instructional core of schools—not only in the United States, but
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everywhere—is built around the extensive use of texts and tests obtained
outside of schools” (Rowan, 2006b, p. 68, emphasis in original). He builds
on this to suggest that, despite the faddishness of many educational reforms,
often such reforms will not affect the core instructional work of schools
because this core is stabilized by relationships with long-standing firms such
as those in the field of educational publishing (Rowan, 2006b).
In theory, the role of market-based ideas in PMM reforms, including the
use of performance-based contracting in a diverse provider model, could
lead to isomorphism resulting from competitive pressures. Intertwined with
ideas of markets as creating incentives for organizations to conform only
if it improves effectiveness and efficiency is the idea of a more “technical”
approach to educational change that is driven not by increased profits but
by improved test scores.
Huerta and Zuckerman (2009) describe an increasing tension between
the demands of the institutional environment for schools and a technical
theory of education that emphasizes monitoring student and school performance. As district (not charter) schools, the schools managed under the
diverse provider model had to contend directly with district norms of legitimacy based on processes and contracts that, at least in theory, emphasized
success in the technical environment.
Using the case of diverse providers in Philadelphia, we looked at the
most visible kinds of changes made by new management organizations in
order to examine whether initially distinct programs were sustained over
time. During 2003–2004, the district moved strongly in the direction of tighter
coupling through its Managed Instruction System. We found that, between
2002 and 2008, all providers (with the exception of Edison) moved in the
direction of conforming to the broader district instructional core. The case of
the increasing commonality among providers working in the diverse provider
model offers an opportunity to examine isomorphic pressures that emerge
from both institutional and competitive sources.

THE DIVERSE PROVIDER MODEL IN PHILADELPHIA2
In 2001, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania took direct control of the School
District of Philadelphia (SDP), declaring it academically and financially distressed. The takeover of the district was based on two pieces of legislation,
passed in 1998 and in 2000, that allowed the state to takeover financially and
underperforming districts. The state takeover gave the Governor and other
Republicans in the legislature the opportunity to test out some of the theories
underlying alternative market-based approaches to governance and management of schools; there was considerable interest at the time in incorporating
school vouchers into reform efforts (Maranto, 2005).
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In preparation for the takeover, the state wrote a $2.7 million contract
with Edison, Inc., a for-profit educational management organization that ran
schools throughout the country, to evaluate the condition of the District
and to make recommendations for the design of the takeover. (The state
awarded the contract despite the lack of a competitive bidding process and
the company’s inexperience in evaluating and managing school districts.)
Edison’s report, issued in October 2001, proposed that up to l00 of the
lowest-performing schools in the District and several functions of the district’s Central Office be placed under private management. The report also
proposed that a five-member appointed commission, rather than the existing
School Board, oversee the district.
Despite a groundswell of resistance, the state established the
Philadelphia School Reform Commission (SRC) and gave it responsibility
for making further decisions about district management and low performing schools. In December 2001, Jim Nevels (a former businessman from the
suburbs) was appointed as chair of the SRC. Before the other four members
of the SRC were appointed, he announced, with the Governor’s approval,
that Edison was in line to manage 60 of the lowest performing schools. This
turn to private management of public schools was, to a large extent, a compromise between those interested in vouchers, those seeking to give control
of the entire district to Edison, and those who were uninterested in private
management or vouchers as a path to district improvement (Maranto, 2005).
Facing public outcry from students, grassroots advocacy groups, unions,
and others against Edison’s proposed large role in managing schools, in early
2002 the now complete SRC called for an open process to select a range of
for-profit, nonprofit and university partners to run individual schools. That
spring, the SRC ultimately chose seven providers to manage 45 of the district’s lowest performing elementary and middle grades schools as part of a
"diverse provider model.” Early in the summer of 2002, the SRC hired Paul
Vallas as CEO of the Philadelphia School District; Vallas moved quickly to
centralize and regularize aspects of the existing system. Vallas had previously
served as CEO of the Chicago Public Schools from 1995 to 2001; prior to his
role in the Chicago Public Schools, he was the budget director to Chicago
Mayor Daley.
In August, the district signed formal contracts with five outside providers
that were implemented a month later. Along with a range of responsibilities
for managing schools, the EMO contracts held for-profit and nonprofit organizations accountable for the percentage of students who scored "proficient"
on the state assessment. At the same time, the two universities (University of
Pennsylvania and Temple University) signed Memoranda of Understanding
with the district. These Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) were much
less comprehensive than the contracts signed with EMOs. The university
partners were only responsible for activities directly related to instruction,
such as curriculum and professional development, and the MOU did not
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specify exact outcomes for student performance. The universities were not
necessarily convinced about the overall model of district change, but were
committed to supporting the district and specific schools in general.
There were three private, for-profit EMOs as providers—Edison, Victory
and Chancellor Beacon. (At the end of the 1st year, the contract with
Chancellor Beacon was cancelled by the district), Two providers were
nonprofit EMOs—Foundations and Universal, and two were university
partners—Temple University and the University of Pennsylvania. Consistent
with the ideas of PMMs, advocates of Philadelphia’s DPM hoped that
new managers would bring innovative instructional practices and that their
schools would serve as educational “laboratories,” ultimately raising student
achievement (Bulkley, Mundell, & Riffer, 2004).
In 2002–2003, the 1st year of the takeover, the School Reform
Commission assigned different numbers of schools to each of the external providers. Edison was assigned to manage 20 schools, reflecting its
important role in the design of the overall reform, while the remaining
providers were each assigned between three and five schools. The providers’
philosophy and approaches included substantial variation in the areas of curricula, required texts, assessments, professional development, scheduling,
afterschool and support programs for low achieving students, and coaching.
We discuss these differences at greater length below.
In addition, a district-designed reform model, the Office of
Reconstructed Schools (ORS), was assigned a total of 21 schools. The unwritten expectation was that the providers would compete with each other to
raise test scores, and ORS would function as a "‘comparison group’ against
which the success of the external providers could be measured” (Christman
et al., 2006, p. 10). In 2002–2003, ORS piloted several elements of what
ultimately was to become the district’s centralized model. The district disbanded the ORS model after 3 years, after it had incorporated many of ORS’
features into the centralized district program that were then implemented in
2003–2004, the 2nd year of the takeover.
The Philadelphia diverse provider model differed in important ways
from the model discussed by Hill and colleagues. A critical aspect of the
theory of change underlying the PMM idea is the creation of a market for education and the overall logic of marketization. Cucchiara and her colleagues
discuss the concept of marketization, which encompasses both “privatization
and . . . broader political and discursive processes through which public entities become increasingly ‘businesslike’” (Cucchiara, Gold, & Simon, 2011).
In the case of Philadelphia, they argue that marketization impacted both the
structure of the district and its relationships with stakeholders. Although the
overall ideas of marketization had substantial influence in Philadelphia, the
most commonly discussed form of an educational market—student choice—
was virtually absent. Overall, the DPM did not increase families’ choices
about which school their children attended. Instead, the “market” created
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under the diverse provider puts the district itself in the central role of
consumer, rather than families (Gold, Christman, & Herold, 2007).
Moreover, district and state negotiations did not enable providers to
fully manage the schools to which they were assigned. Rather, Philadelphia’s
reform model relied on the concept of “thin management,” under which,
among other features, teachers remained district employees and members of
the Philadelphia Teachers Union, while providers were obligated to adhere
to union contracts. The potentially important factor of “buy in” to a provider’s
approach by the teaching staff also was limited by the fact that managers
were required to work with existing staff, although staff members were
offered (and many took) the option of transferring to non-DPM schools.
The district also controlled the budget of providers’ schools, management of
school facilities, and security. Finally, all providers, including ORS, received
additional per pupil funding, ranging from an additional $400–$861 per pupil
in the initial year and subsequently between $450–$750.

METHODS AND DATA
This article emerges from an extensive longitudinal study of the state
takeover of the SDP, and the reforms that have emerged from that significant
governance change. The study, Learning from Philadelphia’s School Reform,
was conducted by a team led by the Philadelphia-based organization,
Research for Action. Data sources for the broader study included:
●

●

●

Interviews with district leaders and leaders of each provider at multiple
points between 2001 and 2006;
Interviews in 2002–2003 with principals in 20 schools; and between
2005–2007 extensive and repeated interviews with principals, teacher leaders, and teachers in nine schools operated by providers and the district’s
Office of Restructured Schools; and
Documents including news articles, policy papers, state, district, and
provider documents, and contracts.

Our primary use of these data sources was through secondary analysis of
articles produced during the study (Bulkley, 2007; Bulkley, Christman et al.,
2010; Bulkley et al., 2004; Bulkley, Olah, & Blanc, 2010; Christman et al.,
2006; Gold, Simon, Cucchiara, Mitchell, & Riffer, 2007; Research for Action,
2005; Travers, 2003; Useem, 2005). In describing the original programs, we
also drew heavily on a description of providers’ programs and approaches
from 2002–2003 that included information on the numbers of schools each
provider managed, staffing changes, curricula, texts, assessments, and special
programs/initiatives (Philadelphia Public School Notebook, 2003).

Philadelphia’s Diverse Provider Model 2002–2008

541

For the purposes of this article, we supplemented the secondary analysis, which primarily provided data about the original approaches of each
provider, as well as some information about change, with additional interviews with representatives of five of the six providers in the summer of 2008.
We were unable to conduct an interview with the sixth provider, but were
able to gather information about their program from other sources. For the
purposes of confidentiality, we do not identify in our analysis the specific
role held by the provider staff interviewed. The focus of these interviews was
on the programs and approaches used by the provider in 2007–2008 and any
reasons they offered for shifts from the original program to the one in operation in at that point in time. All interviews were semistructured and included
open-ended questions.
In order to analyze the data, we created matrices detailing the original and current programs for each provider. In addition to creating the
matrixes, our primary analytic strategy was content analysis through the coding of interviews using Atlas.ti. Specifically, we coded interviews with district
officials, provider staff, and principals for information about changes in a
provider’s program and approach and possible reasons for those changes.
We then examined the coded data, alongside our findings from the matrices, in order to understand better the changes that occurred and analyzed
why these changes happened. We gathered information about district-based
changes from the sources above, as well as the district website and in-house
publications.

THE DISTRICT’S MANAGED INSTRUCTION SYSTEM AND SUPPORTS
Given the short timeline between Vallas’ hiring and the beginning of the
2002–2003 school year, changes in regular district schools his 1st year were
minimal. District schools continued to use texts and curricula that were in
place, and these varied across schools in the district.
The 2nd year of the takeover, 2003–2004, proved to be a critical year
for district schools that were not part of the DPM. That year, Vallas instituted
a range of district reforms, many of which were piloted as part of the ORS.
The most significant reforms involved the MIS, including a core curriculum in
literacy and math, with specified texts for all elementary and middle grades
schools, and a detailed pacing schedule. In math, the district used Everyday
Math in elementary grades and Math in Context in Grades 6–8. In literacy,
they required schools to use Trophies in elementary grades and Elements of
Literature in Grades 6–8. Benchmark tests, aligned with state standards and
the Pennsylvania System of School Assessment (PSSA), were to be administered in 6-week cycles and covered the specific skills and concepts taught
during that cycle.3 The PSSA, in turn, determined whether schools made
Adequate Yearly Progress.
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In addition, a small fraction of district schools implemented SchoolNet,
a computerized data retrieval and resource system that included data on
student achievement in various formats and sample lessons plans. The district
eventually implemented SchoolNet in all its schools as online capacity to
access student data became available. Elements of the MIS were tightly linked
and designed to improve student achievement and increase the number of
students who were “proficient" on the PSSA.
District-wide professional development was scheduled at the same time
in all schools and employed a largely scripted format. The district regularized positions of Literacy and Math Content Leaders in schools, although the
amount of release time varied according to school budgeting. Schools were
required to provide support for low performing students in an Extended
Day Program. Finally, a School Assistance Team (SAT) was assigned by
the district to every school in NCLB (No Child Left Behind) Corrective
Action from 2003–2004 and on, headed by a case manager from the district. Responsibilities of the SAT included observing instruction, collecting
and analyzing data, providing feedback, and writing reports for central office
staff.

District Office of Restructured Schools Model
As noted above, many aspects of the district model (implemented in
2003–2004) were based on changes piloted in the 1st year of the ORS
model in 2002–2003, including math and literacy texts in elementary and
middle grades schools and Academic Coaches and Content Leaders in Math
and Literacy. ORS schools also had versions of benchmark assessments and
extended day programs similar to that found in the MIS. In 2003–2004, ORS
schools were the first group of schools to use SchoolNet. ORS schools were
managed centrally by the ORS leadership team. In contrast to many of the
provider models, where some differences between schools in the model
would become apparent, the ORS model was implemented fairly faithfully in
all of the schools. Moreover, in most respects, aspects of the model continued
over the 3 years that ORS existed.

DIVERSE PROVIDERS IN PRACTICE
In this section, we present a snapshot of approaches of specific providers
at two points in time: 2002–2003, the 1st year of the diverse provider model
and 2007–2008, the 6th year. Many of the providers’ distinctive approaches
in 2002–2003 were developed specifically for their work in the district
schools to which they were assigned. Several of the providers did not have
any prior experience managing schools, and thus were not building on an
existing model. In this sense, several of the models could be described as
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experimental. Because provider contracts and memoranda of understanding
were only signed in August of 2002, most providers used existing reading
and math texts in schools assigned to them the 1st year of the DPM.
(As noted above, the district did not use a common set of texts until the
2003–2004 school year.) Beginning in 2003–2004, and increasingly so in
subsequent years, all of the providers with the exception of Edison, adopted
the instructional core of the district’s approach, the Managed Instructional
System. Because Edison remained the most distinctive during the period of
the study, we discuss it last.

Foundations, Inc
2002–2003
Prior to the DPM, Foundations, Inc., a nonprofit management company,
had run afterschool programs and one charter school in the Philadelphia
metropolitan area but had little expertise in managing district schools.
However, in short time they developed a comprehensive school reform strategy that offered a host of distinctive approaches and programs in the five
schools they ran. They used a variety of approaches in literacy, including
balanced literacy, alongside texts that were already in place in the former
district schools they managed. In addition, they introduced SIPPS, a reading
curriculum that emphasized phonics, phonemic awareness and decoding,
and Reading for Real. In math, Foundations schools used Everyday Math
and Math in Context, texts that the district adopted the following year
as part of its Managed Instruction System. Foundations also used Success
Maker, a computer-based skill development program in reading and math
that assessed students in real time.
Additional assessments included end-of-unit tests, the DIBELS literacy
assessment, and NCS Learn, a computer-based assessment for low performing students. For a percentage of low performing students, Foundations
implemented an “Advocate" program, where mentors worked with students
on Success Maker during and after the school day. All Foundations schools
had a Caring Schools Community program through a previous grant.
School-based professional development was a significant aspect of the
model. It took place every other week for 3 hr through an early dismissal
and additional paid teacher time, as well as during a weeklong Summer
Institute. Foundations Literacy and Math Consultants rotated among the three
Foundations schools and worked directly with teachers and principals.
2007–2008
In 2007–2008, Foundations schools used all elements of the district’s
Managed Instructional System, including the core curriculum, texts, and
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Benchmark assessments. Principals and school leaders also used SchoolNet
to retrieve and analyze data and provided professional development on the
same schedule as the district, mostly following the district script.
However, they continued to use the program Success Maker. They had
discontinued their in-school, 3-hour professional development every other
week, but the organization’s Literacy and Math Consultants provided professional development for two days before the beginning of school and
continued to work with principals and teachers in their schools. Usually
one of the consultants attended school grade group and leadership team
meetings. Foundations also continued to use their Advocate program for low
performing students.
Foundations added features over the years, including administering state
“Foresight” tests four times a year and establishing a Data Room in each
school. They also ran an Extended Day program 4 days a week but used
different programs/materials than the district. In addition, they developed a
voluntary Saturday School Program for students in Grades 4–6 for several
weeks before the PSSA and various programs for parents.
Most of the current practices were in place by the 3rd year. As a representative of Foundations noted, “We didn’t have a curriculum when we
started, so we adopted the district core curriculum the second year.” He
said that Foundations also recognized that a large percentage of students
transfer to other district schools during a year, and the core curriculum
and pacing schedule would provide consistency for students. According
to him, however, "Foundations didn’t change anything that works for
children."
Foundations staff believed that “buy in” by the principals was critical.
Thus, as one representative said, “We let them adjust their approaches using
their professional judgment." For example, one principal had: introduced the
Children’s Literacy Initiative, with training for K–3 teachers; implemented the
Foundations “Kids’ Zone” afterschool program with activities for students
in Grade 5–8; and obtained a grant to provide 100 families with their own
computers.

Universal Companies
2002–2003
Universal Companies, a nonprofit management company whose overall
focus is on community development and faith-based initiatives in a section
of Philadelphia, maintained its community orientation in the three schools
it took over. The organization did not have a background in school management and drew heavily on district programs already operating in the
schools it managed, especially in the areas of curriculum and materials.
Schools managed by Universal used the same texts used in their schools
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before the takeover. They also maintained programs put in place previously
through the Johns Hopkins Talent Development program, which the district
had discontinued after the state takeover.
Distinct programs in the Universal model included a computerbased testing program called “Lightspan,” and the “Universal Institute for
Professional Development,” which offered weekend and after-school sessions for school staff. In its schools, Universal, sought to create deep and substantive partnerships with the community, including faith-based community
groups. They worked closely with parents, including implementing a
Homelinks homework program that parents were expected to monitor and
a summer reading program.
2007–2008
Once the district introduced the MIS, Universal quickly implemented key
features, influenced by a Universal central administrator who had come from
the district’s Curriculum Office and supported the idea of a core curriculum.
Universal schools used the same literacy and math texts as those adopted
by the school district. Universal stopped using the “Lightspan” computerbased testing, and instead opted to use the district’s Benchmark and literacy
assessments, as staff felt they would better align with their use of the core
curriculum. They were enthusiastic users of Benchmark data, despite seeing limitations for assessing growth in student learning. Universal offered
the same as the Extended Day program as that used in regular district
schools.
Although the content of professional development varied based on staff
assessments about individual school needs, it occurred on the same schedule as in the district, discontinuing the weekend and after school professional
development previously provided. However, Universal had "contracted days"
where they delivered their own professional development and required principals to complete “action frameworks” that included progress on the district
program. Universal schools used SchoolNet, but reformatted data in a way
that the staff believed was more “user friendly.”
Although Universal’s program aligned with the district’s in many core
areas, the company also worked to extend and deepen the district’s
curriculum—sometimes in a more prescriptive way. For example, Universal
developed its own program of standardized homework connected to the
district core curriculum. This standardized homework became a foundation
for conversations between Universal and school staff around student work.
As a Universal representative said, “You have to monitor and you have to
review the student work. That to me has been the most powerful—what the
students are responding to and what they aren’t responding to.”
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University of Pennsylvania
The University of Pennsylvania largely agreed to become a provider at the
urging of the SRC. The Penn Graduate School of Education took almost
complete responsibility for working with three schools located near the university with which it had previously had worked. The transition to the DPM
was not as abrupt for these schools as was the case with schools assigned to
other providers. Penn continued relationships with partner schools in terms
of student teachers, student tutors and workshops given by their Education
faculty, as well as support for individual school level initiatives in curriculum
and pedagogy.
In the 1st year, Penn essentially used the pre-existing curriculum and
texts in math, literacy, and writing and the instructional approaches in these
three schools. In many respects, Penn’s approach was inquiry-based and
often required students to show what they knew through performancebased, authentic assessments. The most distinctive aspect of Penn’s approach
was the requirement that all teachers attend 120 hr of professional development a year, with a choice to attend a combination of district professional
developmental sessions and six Penn-led study groups in math, literacy, and
writing.

2007–2008
By 2007–2008, Penn had adopted all of the key features of the district’s
Managed Instructional System, including the district’s core curriculum and
the accompanying texts in math and literacy; the Benchmark assessments,
and SchoolNet. They had Content Leaders in Math and Literacy, though
responsibilities and release time varied by school. However, they also used
Graduate School of Education coordinators and graduate students to provide
direct support to teachers and classrooms. Penn followed the district’s schedule (although added a summer retreat) for professional development but did
not use the district script. Instead they based professional development sessions on needs identified in individual schools’ School Improvement Plans.
They had discontinued the requirement for 120 hr of professional development outside of school hours out of concern that this expectation was
excessive.
There were several other distinctive features of Penn’s approach, including twice-yearly math tests that focused on content and skills not covered
by the Benchmarks, formative assessments for classroom use, and analysis
of student work. Penn staff worked with teachers to develop multi-grade
writing prompts and poetry units, and bought multicultural trade books to
supplement the core curriculum. Penn did not offer the district’s Extended
Day Program, but developed SOAR, a metacognitive program for students
below the 40th percentile on the PSSA. Penn schools were also able to access
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resources, workshops and outreach activities, and afterschool programs
through Nutter Center, which provides outreach to the West Philadelphia
community as part of its mission to serve the community where the university
is located.
Penn had reservations about some of the district approaches and
attempted to retain some of the educational approaches that were consistent
with the philosophy and practices taught at its Graduate School of Education.

Temple University
2002–2003
Under Temple’s "memorandum of understanding" with the district, the Office
of the President assumed oversight of the partnership and hired a Temple
Coordinator. During 2002–2003, Temple continued pre-existing relationships by partnering with five schools near the university, providing student
teachers, interns, tutors, and special programs. Two Temple faculty offered
semester-long courses in literacy and math for teachers who wanted to attend
and observed classes of teachers who participated in the literacy course during the spring semester. Temple also offered workshops for parents on a
number of topics during the year.
Temple acknowledged, however, that in many respects 2002–2003 was
a "planning year," and that their presence in schools was limited. During
the year, Temple staff worked with principals and faculty to determine the
instructional focus for subsequent years. Each of the Temple schools chose
a literacy focus.
2007–2008
In 2007–2008, responsibility for the Temple partnership was transferred
from the Office of the President to the Dean of the School of Education.
Temple used the MIS, including the district core curriculum, Benchmarks and
required texts in both literacy and math, but adapted these for own their purposes. Temple had adopted the core curriculum in math and accompanying
texts at the same time the district did. However, from 2003–2005 they maintained a unique literacy curriculum that emphasized "shared reading" and,
most significantly, taught using texts at students’ instructional level rather
than their grade level, as was the case in the district. They also used supplementary texts at students’ instructional levels. While Temple used both
the math and literacy core curriculum in 2007–2008, some schools did not
follow the pacing schedule or teach concepts or skills in the same order.
Thus they did not rely on the district’s Benchmarks as assessments of what
students learned during 6-week cycles. They relied heavily on analysis of
student work using personnel from external organizations and teachers in
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Temple schools. Temple principals used SchoolNet, but not necessarily in
the manner prescribed by the district. Temple schools also offered an afterschool literacy program that was open to all students, but low-performing
students were encouraged to attend.
Some professional development offered by three external educational
organizations occurred on the same schedule as the district. However, a
major part of professional development involved staff from these organizations who worked with teachers in their classrooms and modeled
“constructivist” instructional approaches. During the summer, Temple offered
an intensive 4-week session of professional development in which teachers not only received professional development in formal sessions but also
taught classes in which they experimented with approaches they learned.

Victory Schools
2002–2003
Victory, a for-profit management company, was already operating a small
number of charter schools in other cities before coming to Philadelphia.
During the 1st year of the DPM, in the three schools it managed, Victory
implemented Direct Instruction in reading and used the accompanying
assessments. In writing, they had a separate program, Step Up to Writing.
They also introduced Core Knowledge. In math, they used the texts that
existed in the schools they took over. In terms of professional development, Victory required 40 hr of paid professional development for teachers
in their core programs during the summer and school year. In addition they
offered optional workshops on Saturdays and after school for which teachers received a stipend. They used school-based Coaches and specialized
subject matter Coaches in all their schools. A distinctive feature of Victory’s
approach was the separation of male and female students in middle grades
"academies," with deans for each academy.
2007–2008
Victory Schools made some significant changes between 2002 and 2008. Most
notably, they decided to stop using Direct Instruction and adopted the district’s core curriculum, including the literacy and math texts. They scheduled
in-house professional development at the same time as the district and had
access to SchoolNet, though it is unclear how it was used. Because several attempts to contact a representative from Victory were unsuccessful, we
were not able to document additional features of their model in 2007–2008.
Likewise, we could not document whether Victory continued some of the
distinctive features of the model discussed above. From news reports in the
local media, however, we know that Victory maintained, and expanded, its
focus on single-gender schooling.
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Edison Schools
2002–2003
In 2002, Philadelphia contracted with Edison to manage 20 schools—far
more schools than any other provider organization. Edison Schools was an
established for-profit EMO nationally and had the most clearly developed
and distinct educational program among the providers, with many components that were in place already in Edison schools outside of Philadelphia.
Their model included the use of Success for All (K–5), which incorporated
prescribed teaching strategies and Choices in Literature (6–8) for instruction
in literacy. They used Everyday Math (K–5) and Connected Math (6–8) for
instruction in math
Edison used a previously developed system of benchmark assessments, tied to an elaborate computer-based system, which one staff member
described as the "heart of what we do at Edison." Edison benchmarks were
conceptually different from those used in the MIS, in that they tested and
retested students on the same content at several points during the year in
order to determine student progress. (The district Benchmarks were aligned
with the core curriculum taught in each cycle and questions differed from
cycle to cycle.) The district’s development of its Benchmark assessment system, however, seems to have been spurred in part by the use of benchmark
tests in the Edison model.
Edison offered its own character education program and after-school
programs. They provided extensive paid professional development for
teachers and school leaders during the summer and the school year that
focused on aspects of their model and strategies for teaching the required
texts. Three centrally-based Achievement Directors oversaw and supported
the implementation of their program. Content coaches, called Curriculum
Coordinators, worked directly with teachers in math, literacy, and science in
each school.

2007–2008
More so than any of the other providers, in 2007–2008, Edison had maintained a program that was distinct from the district’s approach. They
continued to use different curricula in literacy and in middle grades math,
although they used the same textbooks the district did in K–5 mathematics.
They continued to use their own benchmark and student data retrieval systems. They also continued to use Curriculum Coordinators and Achievement
Directors who specifically supported instruction based on their approaches
and texts in math, literacy, and science. The changes in the Edison model
over time were minimal, with the most significant piece being the development of a new extended day program, called “Learning Force." The program
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was piloted in Philadelphia, and was then was implemented in Edison
schools in other locations.
As the district and Edison slowly worked out their roles, Edison drew
more directly on the district for operational needs and supports. One Edison
staff member said that, “We have made shifts in our resources more toward
instruction and achievement and away from operational services.” Thus,
issues such as school safety became more the responsibility of the district.
(This pattern of a shift in operational issues to the district was common
across all the providers.) Edison staff participated in district professional
development that focused on noninstructional issues, but continued its own
professional development in the area of instruction and implementation of
its model. Edison principals used SchoolNet for limited purposes, such as
retrieving operational data (i.e., attendance and suspensions) rather than for
reporting and analyzing student performance data.
In 2008–2009, the University of Pennsylvania and Temple University
decided not to continue their partnerships with the district. The other
providers continued as part of the diverse provider model, but in several
cases they were asked to manage fewer schools than they initially were
assigned by the School Reform Commission. The district took over a number
of provider schools that had consistently failed to make AYP and had been
in Corrective Action for 6 years. These schools returned to the district as part
of a newly created CEO district.

PATTERNS IN SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
PROVIDERS AND THE DISTRICT
The above descriptions demonstrate key ways in which most of the providers
relinquished a considerable amount of their individuality in the period covered by our research. (Because the case of Edison is distinct, in that they
retained more elements of its initial approach than did other providers, in
the analysis that follows, we discuss it separately.) As shown in Tables 1
and 2, the major shifts happened around the Managed Instruction System.
By 2007–2008, all of the providers, except Edison, were using the district’s
core curriculum in reading and math and companion texts, Benchmark tests
aligned with the core curriculum, and SchoolNet. In addition, all providers
offered professional development on the district’s professional development
half- and full-day schedule and in many cases covered the same topics and
used the district script.
At the same time, providers also retained distinctive features of their
initial programs and initiated some new approaches. Most frequently,
providers offered supplemental curricula and assessments designed to work
with/expand upon the district’s program. Table 2 reflects these variations,
including the availability of different types of supports for teachers such as
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TABLE 1 District and Provider Programs (2002–2003)

District Program Edison Foundations Victory Universal Penn Temple
Number of Schools
Curriculum and texts
Curriculum
Used curriculum in
place in schools
Math texts
Math texts (varied)
Literacy approach Balanced literacy
and varied texts
Assessments
Standardized
TerraNova and
PSSA
Additional
Varied
assessments
Professional development
Schedule
Varied
Content
Varied
Varied
Teacher supports
(including
coaches)
After school
Varied
programs

20

5

5

3

3

5

∗

&

∗

&

&

&

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

&

∗

&

&

&

X

X

X

X

X

X

∗

&

&

&

&

&

∗

∗

∗

∗

?

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

Note. X= Use of district approach; & = Mix of district, existing school and provider approaches;
∗
= Use of provider approaches; ? = Unknown.

coaches. In many cases, they developed their own topics for professional
development sessions, and in some cases they provided additional professional development during the school year and the summer. Several designed
their own afterschool programs. As well, some of the original “hallmarks” of
programs were retained such as single-sex schooling for Victory Schools and
the use of Penn Graduate School of Education faculty and graduate students
to implement their model.

ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Student Achievement in the Diverse Provider Model and Competitive
Isomorphism
Because the goals of the district and provider schools were focused on
improving test scores on the PSSA, below we report key findings regarding
achievement gains in provider schools that were identified in a study conducted by RAND and Research for Action in 2007 (Gill, Zimmer, Christman,
& Blanc, 2007). The study included data from the first 4 years of the diverse
provider model.
Gill and his colleagues examined the achievement of students in schools
under different “treatments” (provider and school district schools, including
those in the ORS model) and compared the trends in school achievement
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TABLE 2 District and Provider Programs (2008)
District
Curriculum and texts
Core curriculum
Core curriculum
with pacing
schedule
Math texts
K–5 Everyday
Math, 6–8 Math
in Context
Literacy texts
K–5 Trophies,
6–8 Elements of
Literature
Assessments
Standardized
PSSA, Terra Nova
(only in grades
1,2)
Additional
District
assessments
Benchmarks,
(benchmarks
additional district
and others)
assessments
Professional development
Schedule
Full and 1/2 days
throughout year
Content
District scripts for
most sessions
Math and Literacy
Teacher supports
Content Leaders
(including
coaches)
After school
Extended day
programs
Data system
SchoolNet

Edison Foundations Victory Universal Penn Temple
∗

X

X

X

X

&

&

X

X

X

X

X

∗

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

∗

X

&

X

&

&

X

X

X

X

X

∗

&

&

?

&

∗

∗

∗

&

∗

&

&

∗

∗

&

?

X

∗

∗

&

X

X

X

X

X

Note. Shaded cells are those in which the provider was more similar to the district in 2007–2008 than in
2002–2003. X = Use of district approach; & = Mix of district, existing school and provider approaches;
∗
= Use of provider approaches; ? = Unknown.

they identified. The research analyzed growth in academic performance on
the PSSA for children attending provider schools as a group compared to
growth in achievement of students in regular district schools; compared the
gains made by students in specific provider models to one another; and compared growth in achievement for students in individual provider schools. It is
important to note that this research investigated growth in student achievement for individual students, rather than the percentage of proficient students
on the PSSA in tested grades in each school, the approach used to determine
AYP. The study’s analytic approach allowed each student to serve as his or
her own control, thereby factoring out characteristics of students (such as
race, ethnicity, and other unchanging family and student characteristics) that
may affect student achievement results.
In the 4 years of the study, student achievement across the district,
including in the provider schools, rose significantly. However, after 4 years
of intervention, even though schools in the diverse provider model received
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substantial amounts of additional per pupil funding, average student gains
in math and literacy in privately managed schools were not statistically different than those of students in regular district schools. Moreover, when
student achievement gains in the three provider types (for-profit and nonprofit EMOs and universities) were compared with each other, there were
no statistically significant effects, positive or negative, for any of the three
types of provider models. Finally, achievement gains for students attending
individual provider schools showed few statistically differences from one
another. The only model that showed growth in student achievement was
ORS, the district’s reform model. In math, student growth was significantly
greater than that of students in either provider or regular district schools.
The results of this research challenge advocates’ expectations that
implementation of Philadelphia’s diverse provider model, premised on quasimarket-based competition, would dramatically improve student achievement. It also suggests that the reasons for the increasing program similarities
described above was not the result of competitive isomorphism tied to clear
pressures from a technical environment in which organizations become more
similar because those similarities are leading to increased efficiency or effectiveness (Huerta & Zuckerman, 2009). Why, then, might these similarities
have emerged?

Influences of Institutional Isomorphism
Despite initial hopes for the diverse provider model to promote different
approaches to reform of the schools they were assigned, with the notable
exception of the schools managed by Edison, the model did not yield the
dramatic variations in approaches to school improvement. In order to better understand the pressures that led five of the providers to adopt most
features of the district’s Managed Instructional System, we draw on ideas of
institutionalization and isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008).
Specifically, we analyze the coercive/regulatory and noncoercive isomorphic
pressures operating in the Philadelphia context that we believe help explain
the shifts toward school district approaches.

Coercive/Regulatory Isomorphic Pressures
As discussed earlier, coercive/regulatory isomorphic pressures largely come
through the political or legal environment, including factors such as
government actions and contractual requirements. In Philadelphia, there was
extreme pressure by district administrators on regular district schools and
schools managed by providers to raise the number of proficient students
and meet Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP), not only because the district did
not meet NCLB requirements but also because the district was under state
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takeover. By far the most important goal of the district’s reform plan was
to improve student achievement on the PSSA. Schools that did not achieve
AYP were designated in Corrective Action and potentially faced increasingly
severe sanctions as required by NCLB. In this regard, the success of the EMOs
(and their continued operation in the district) was intended to be based on
a more technical approach that did not depend on increased efficiency and
profits but on improved student achievement on the PSSA.
In addition to sanctions, there were additional district-based coercive
pressures on schools that failed to make AYP. Vallas’ heavy hand around
issues such as curriculum and the overall MIS played an important role in
these pressures (Bulkley, Christman, et al., 2010). In schools managed by
providers, those in the ORS model and regular district schools, the district implemented School Assistance Teams. These teams, headed by an
individual appointed by the district, monitored school performance, conducted evaluative walkthroughs and reported findings to the district Office of
Accountability. The presence of School Assistance Teams in provider schools
that were in Corrective Action increased pressures felt by management
organizations.
Providers initially anticipated competing with each other in raising
school achievement, based on their unique approaches. However, it became
increasingly clear that, in fact, they were competing against academic
achievement of students in regular district schools. At least part of the
providers’ motivation to adopt the district’s MIS, with the exception of
Edison, was because they recognized that if school achievement in their
schools lagged in comparison to that in regular district schools, poor performance on the PSSA could be attributed to not adopting the tightly
coupled and prescriptive approach of the MIS. In this regard, none of
providers wanted to fall behind the district or other providers on PSSA results
(Christman et al., 2006).

Noncoercive Isomorphic Pressures
Noncoercive isomorphic pressures, such as pressures from networks and
professional norms, were also clearly in play in Philadelphia. For one, a
number of the providers initially hired administrators with strong ties to the
SDP. Such hires not only enabled them to build relationships with the district,
but also resulted in ideas from the district influencing provider practices.
Perhaps more importantly, teachers often retained their core identity
as district employees rather than provider teachers. Teachers in provider
schools remained SDP employees and union members. Moreover, most
teachers in provider schools, with the exception of new teachers hired after
the inception of the diverse provider model, had been socialized to the same
professional norms as teachers in regular district schools. Because teachers in
provider schools would return to district schools if their provider’s contract
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was not renewed, which was a possibility since the outset of the diverse
provider model, their professional loyalty often was to the district, rather
than to the provider. This loyalty proved prescient. In 2008–2009, the SRC
did, in fact, take some schools away from all of the providers and returned
them to district management. Teachers in these schools once again became
"full members" of the Philadelphia teaching force.
Another noncoercive isomorphic pressure was the establishment of
an EMO district for provider schools in 2003–2004. A district administrator chaired the group and facilitated discussion of common issues faced by
EMOs in Philadelphia. It was a place where EMO staff could discuss their
problems candidly and without a sense of competition. The EMO district
enabled providers to collaborate in ways that were not evident in the initial
year, because they now appreciated that their fortunes were linked. In 2004,
a conference sponsored by the PSD and the federal government, entitled
“Innovations in Education: Building a Public-Private Partnership Model for
K–12 Reform,” included discussion of their collaboration. The nature of “thin
management," in which providers in Philadelphia’s model were not afforded
the degree of control over the management of their schools advocated by
Hill and colleagues (2009), also meant that there was significant interaction
between district administrators and provider schools in areas such as Title I
and facilities.
Finally, for a number of the diverse providers in Philadelphia, entering into the management of schools was a new and uncertain effort.
Furthermore, ambiguity about the roles of the district vis à vis the provider
only served to further this uncertainty (Bulkley et al., 2004). Because many
providers were uncertain about how to improve PSSA results, over time they
came to adopt core elements of the district’s MIS that the district touted
for improving student achievement. In fact, the areas in which the providers’
programs varied from the district’s and with each other’s often built upon the
basic components of the MIS, deepening or broadening its focus, by providing teacher supports and after-school programs tied to improving student
achievement on the PSSA.

Why Didn’t Edison Change Significantly?
Given all the pressures for providers to align more closely with the district,
how is it that the Edison program remained relatively unchanged during
this time period? In terms of coercive pressures, Edison’s model and the
company’s experience nationally was already tied to attempts to raise test
scores on state assessments. Edison was in a position where it needed to
push back against isomorphic pressures because staff had to consider not
only the schools in Philadelphia, but also the company’s “brand” as a school
manager nationwide. To make significant changes in Philadelphia, as the
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other providers did, could easily be interpreted by investors and others as a
challenge to the value of the model itself.
Moreover, noncoercive pressures on Edison were less potent. For example, the three Achievement Directors for Edison schools in Philadelphia
worked outside of individual schools in the district and had no prior connection with the district. They were hired to work specifically with Edison
in Philadelphia. The training of these individuals in the Edison educational
model was intensive. Thus, individuals in the best position to make decisions about the program did not view themselves as district affiliated, but
instead reported to Edison representatives at the national level. Likewise,
Edison hired most new principals from outside Philadelphia and provided
them extensive professional development in the Edison model. In addition,
Edison’s school design appeared to provide more guidance, especially at the
elementary level, for provider level staff and teachers.

IMPORTANCE OF STUDY/IMPLICATIONS
In part from pressures related to NCLB, and pressures to increase choice
within public school systems, an increasing number of school districts have
been developing some form of a PMM that includes schools run by outside providers (Bulkley, Henig et al., 2010). However, the Philadelphia story
demonstrates how the theoretical promise of “innovative” educational programs may not play out in practice due to the kinds of isomorphic pressures
described here. Although the changes at the district level in Philadelphia,
especially the introduction of the MIS and the powerful influences of a
Vallas-led central office, made the pressures on providers particularly strong,
providers in other contexts may encounter similar kinds of isomorphic pressures. Policy makers should consider the Philadelphia experience carefully,
including the reasons why it varied from the “ideal” model laid out by Hill
and his colleagues, if considering bringing in outside providers as a strategy for enhancing innovation, variation, and achievement (Hill et al., 2012).
In particular, they should consider the strong pressures on providers over
time that may lead them to become increasingly indistinguishable from the
district.
Some would argue that the Philadelphia MIS is an educationally sound
approach, and that providers are adding something to it through additional
teacher supports and programmatic approaches. However, what was in place
by 2008 was a far cry from the vision of those who argued that the DPM
would bring substantial innovations and gains in student achievement. EMO
leaders (whether nonprofit or for-profit) and principals of schools in a PMM
also need to anticipate and find ways to respond to pressures such as those
described here in an increasingly “public/private hybrid” educational enterprise, if they are to strive toward the initial promise of a diverse provider
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model (Henig, Holyoke, Lacireno-Paquet, & Moser, 2003; Rufos-Lignos &
Richards, 2003).

NOTES
1. In this article, we use the term “diverse provider model,” or DPM, as this was the language most
used in Philadelphia.
2. This section draws heavily on Travers (2003).
3. For more information about the Philadelphia Benchmark tests, see Bulkley (2010).

REFERENCES
Bulkley, K. E. (2007). Bringing the public into the private: Changing the rules of the
game and new regime politics in Philadelphia public education. Educational
Policy, 21(1), 155–184.
Bulkley, K. E. (2010). Introduction–Portfolio management models in urban school
reform. In K. E. Bulkley, J. R. Henig, & H. M. Levin (Eds.), Between public
and private: Politics, governance, and the new portfolio models for urban school
reform (pp. 3–26). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press.
Bulkley, K. E., Christman, J. B., & Gold, E. (2010). One step back, two steps forward:
The making and remaking of "radical" reform in Philadelphia. In K. E. Bulkley, J.
R. Henig, & H. M. Levin (Eds.), Between public and private: Politics, governance,
and the new portfolio models for urban school reform (pp. 127–164). Cambridge,
MA: Harvard Education Press.
Bulkley, K. E., Henig, J. R., & Levin, H. M. (Eds.). (2010). Between public and private: Politics, governance, and the new portfolio models for urban school reform.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press.
Bulkley, K. E., Mundell, L. M., & Riffer, M. (2004). Contracting out schools: The first
year of the Philadelphia Diverse Provider Model. Philadelphia, PA: Research for
Action.
Bulkley, K. E., Olah, L. N., & Blanc, S. (Eds.). (2010). Benchmarks for success?
Interim assessments as a strategy for educational improvement. Peabody Journal
of Education, 85(2).
Burch, P. (2007). Educational policy and practice from the perspective of institutional
theory: Crafting a wider lens. Educational Researcher, 36(2), 84–95.
Christman, J. B., Gold, E., & Herold, B. (2006, June). Privatization "Philly Style":
What can be learned from Philadelphia’s diverse provider model of school
management? (Updated ed.). Philadelphia, PA: Research for Action.
Cucchiara, M., Gold, E., & Simon, E. (2011). Contracts, choice, and customer service:
Marketization and public engagement in education. Teachers College Record,
113(11), 2460–2502.
Davies, S., Quirke, L., & Aurini, J. (2006). The new institutionalism goes to the market: The challenge of rapid growth in private K-12 education. In H.-D. Meyer &

558

K. E. Bulkley and E. Travers

B. Rowan (Eds.), The new institutionalism in education (pp. 103–122). Albany,
NY: SUNY Press.
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism
and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review,
48(2), 147–160.
Gill, B., Zimmer, R., Christman, J. B., & Blanc, S. (2007). State takeover, school restructuring, private management, and student achievement in Philadelphia. Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Gold, E., Christman, J. B., & Herold, B. (2007). Blurring the boundaries: Private sector
involvement in Philadelphia public schools. American Journal of Education,
113(7), 181–212.
Gold, E., Simon, E., Cucchiara, M., Mitchell, C., & Riffer, M. (2007). A Philadelphia
story: Building civic capacity for school reform in a privatizing system.
Philadelphia, PA: Research for Action.
Gyurko, J., & Henig, J. R. (2010). Strong vision, learning by doing, or the politics of
muddling through? New York City. In K. E. Bulkley, J. R. Henig, & H. M. Levin
(Eds.), Between public and private: Politics, governance, and the new portfolio
models for urban school reform. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press.
Henig, J. R., Holyoke, T. T., Lacireno-Paquet, N., & Moser, M. (2003). Privatization,
politics, and urban services: The political behavior of charter schools. Journal
of Urban Affairs, 25(1), 37–54.
Hill, P. T., Campbell, C., & Gross, B. (2012). Strife and progress: Portfolio strategies
for managing urban schools. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Hill, P. T., Campbell, C., & Harvey, J. (2000). It takes a city: Getting serious about
urban school reform. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Hill, P. T., Campbell, C., Menefee-Libey, D., Dusseault, B., DeArmond, M., & Gross,
B. (2009). Portfolio school districts for big cities: An interim report (p. 55).
Seattle, WA: Center on Reinventing Public Education, University of Washington.
Hill, P. T., Pierce, L., & Guthrie, J. (1997). Reinventing public education : How contracting can transform America’s schools (RAND Research Study). Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Huerta, L. A., & Zuckerman, A. (2009). An institutional theory analysis of charter schools: Addressing institutional challenges to scale. Peabody Journal of
Education, 84(3), 414–431.
Levy, D. C. (2006). How private higher education’s growth challenges the new institutionalism. In H.-D. Meyer & B. Rowan (Eds.), The new institutionalism in
education (pp. 143–161). Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Maranto, R. (2005). A tale of two cities: School privatization in Philadelphia and
Chester. American Journal of Education, 111(2), 151–190.
Menefee-Libey, D. (2010). Neoliberal school reform in Chicago? Renaissance 2010,
portfolios of schools, and diverse providers. In K. E. Bulkley, J. R. Henig, & H.
M. Levin (Eds.), Between public and private: Politics, governance, and the new
portfolio models for urban school reform (pp. 55–90). Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Education Press.
Meyer, H.-D., & Rowan, B. (Eds.). (2006). The new institutionalism in education.
Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Philadelphia’s Diverse Provider Model 2002–2008

559

Mezzacappa, D. (2012, April 24). Radical district reorganization, 64 school closings planned, 2013. Retrieved from http://thenotebook.org/blog/124746/radicaldistrict-reorganization-64-school-closings-planned
Paauwe, J., & Boselie, P. (2003). Challenging ’strategic HRM’ and the relevance of
the institutional setting. Human Resource Management Journal, 13(3), 56–70.
Philadelphia Public School Notebook. (2003, Summer). A look at the school managers
in the ’multiple provider’ model. Author, p. 15.
Research for Action. (2005). The "Original 86". Philadelphia, PA: Research for Action.
Rowan, B. (2006a). The new institutionalism and the study of educational organizations: Changing ideas for changing times. In H.-D. Meyer & B. Rowan (Eds.),
The new institutionalism in education (pp. 15–32). Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Rowan, B. (2006b). The school improvement industry in the United States: Why educational change is both pervasive and ineffectual. In H.-D. Meyer & B. Rowan
(Eds.), The new institutionalism in education (pp. 67–86). Albany, NY: SUNY
Press.
Rufos-Lignos, P., & Richards, C. E. (2003). Emerging forms of school organization.
Teachers College Record, 105(5), 753–781.
Scott, W. R. (2008). Institutions and organizations: Ideas and interests (3rd ed.). Los
Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.
Socolar, P. (2009). District negotiates to modify EMO model at 28 schools.
Philadelphia Public School Notebook, 17(2). Retrieved from http://thenotebook.
org/fall-2009/091825/district-negotiates-modify-emo-model-28-schools
Strang, D., & Meyer, J. W. (1993). Institutional conditions for diffusion. Theory and
Society, 22, 487–511.
Travers, E. (2003). The state takeover in Philadelphia: Where we are and how we got
here. Philadelphia, PA: Research for Action.
Useem, E. (2005). Learning from Philadelphia’s school reform: What do the research
findings show so far? Philadelphia, PA: Research for Action.

Copyright of Journal of School Choice is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content
may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright
holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for
individual use.

